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PSROs AND FEDERAL CIVIL IMMUNITY:
A BRIEF ANALYSIS
Raymond D. Cotton* and
Harry G. Collier, Jr.**
The 1972 Bennett Amendment' to the Social Security Act established
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) as a review mechanism to
promote both cost- and quality-control in the Medicaid and Medicare programs.
The stated goals of this amendment were to insure that Medicaid and Medicare
services that were provided and subsequently reimbursed by the federal govern-
ment were in fact "medically necessary" 2 and rendered in conformance with
"appropriate professional standards." 3 The actual intent of the legislation, the
structure of PSROs on the regional, state, and national level, and the procedures
for promulgating norms, standards, and criteria for diagnosis and treatment, have
been dealt with at length elsewhere;4 this paper will examine some of the legal
implications of one specific provision of this important federal program, the so-
called "civil immunity clause." 5
This clause attempts to confer immunity from civil liability upon any
health care provider who acts in compliance with or reliance upon the norms,
standards, and criteria developed by a PSRO, as long as such person is in fact
functioning in his role as a provider of health services and exercises "due care
in all professional conduct taken or directed by him and reasonably related to,
and resulting from, the actions taken in compliance with or reliance upon such
professionally accepted norms of care and treatment" 6 (emphasis added). Al-
though to date no cases have been reported in which a defendant provider at-
tempted to rely on this rather broad immunity provision, a good deal of legal
discussion and speculation regarding its efficacy has been generated in the five
years since enactment. This study will briefly examine some of the more impor-
tant legal questions raised by the civil immunity clause.
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1. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1320c to c-19 (Supp. IV, 1974).
2. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1320c (1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
3. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1320 (Supp. IV, 1974).
4. See Office of Professional Standards Review, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare,
P.S.R.O. Program Manual (1974). See also Note, Federally Imposed Self.Regulation of Medical Practice:
A Critique of the Professional Standards Review Organization, 42 G.W.L. Rev. 822 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as 42 G.W.L. Rev.].
5. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1320c-16 iSupp. IV, 1974).
6. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1320c-16 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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At the outset one must question whether the federal government can in
fact preempt state tort law regarding negligence and medical malpractice. This is
apparently the only important issue which has been presented squarely to the
judiciary, and the court involved failed to resolve it. In Association of American
Physicians and Surgeons v. Weinberger, I the plaintiffs challenged the constitu-
tionality of Congress' attempt to legislate immunity from common law tort
liability, fearing that the purported immunity provision would be ineffective and
that the promulgation of specific norms and standards for diagnosis and treatment
would potentially subject them to an increased risk of liability in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.' Holding that the plaintiff physicians did not face the type of
real or immediate threat of injury as would confer the requisite standing to sue,
the court stated that Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries would be the proper
parties to bring such an action and thus specifically declined to rule on the consti-
tutionality of the immunity clause. 9 In its motion for summary judgment, the
government had alleged, first, that Congress could in fact abolish common law
rights or create new rights if it did so in pursuit of a permissible legislative ob-
jective;10 second, it had contended that the PSRO legislation met this test as a
permissible attempt to provide for the "general welfare" under Article I, Section
8, of the Constitution, pursuant to both the taxing power and "necessary and
proper clause" contained likewise in Article I, Sec. 8.11 Although technically
still an open question since the court did not reach the merits of this point, it
appears that the government would be able to defend successfully its usurpation
of state common law tort liability.
A separate but related issue is raised by the "due care" proviso cited
above, requiring that a provider use due care in all conduct "reasonably related
to" reliance upon or compliance with PSRO norms of care.1 2 'The interpretation
given to this somewhat nebulous guideline could well determine the ultimate
efficacy of the immunity clause, and there are at least three differing interpre-
tations which might be applied.I 3 First, it could be argued by a plaintiff that the
language "reasonably related to, and resulting from," etc., would mandate that a
provider use due care both in selecting the appropriate PSRO standards of diag-
nosis and treatment and in actually carrving out the chosen treatment. This all-
inclusive view of due care would render the statutory grant of immunity virtually
meaningless and thus would not seem to comport with the intent of the legisla-
tion. At the other extreme, it might be argued that Congress intended the grant
of immunity to supersede any pommon law notions of due care and that, accord-
ingly, the protection afforded is absolute; that is, it would extend to the decision
to follow a given course of treatment (in accord with PSRO norms and standards)
7. 395 F. Supp. 125 (1975).
8. 395 F. Supp. 125, 138-39 (1975).
9. 395 F. Supp. 125, 138-39 (1975).
10. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 122, Association
of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Weinberger, Civil No. 73C-1653 (N.D. Ill., filed Dec. 11, 1973),
citing Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
11. Supra, note 10.
12. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1320c-16 (Supp. IV, 1974).
13. See 42 G.W.L. Rev., supra note 4, at 838-39; Simmons and Ball, PSRO and the Dissolution of
the Malpractice Suit, 6 U. ToL L. Rev. 739,758-59 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Simmons and Ball] ; Carter,
Medical Malpractice Immunity: A Realistic Prognosis for the Social Security Act's Civil Immunity Provision,
47 Miss. L.J. 621, 637-39 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Carter].
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and to the actual treatment rendered. Again, however, this would not seem to
reflect true Congressional intent, as it would obviate the inclusion of the due care
proviso within the immunity clause and remove virtually all legal recourse for a
plaintiff who had, in fact, been the victim of truly negligent treatment.
The third alternative, seemingly better-reasoned and espoused most often
by commentators on the issue,1 4 is an intermediate position. Under this, the
physician would still be charged with due care in the actual treatment given a
patient, but would be accorded an irrebuttable presumption of non-negligencein
diagnosis and selection of a course of treatment, if applicable PSRO norms and
standards were followed. The caveat here is that the norms and standards chosen
would in fact have to be applicable to the case in question; the plaintiff still
might be able to show either that the initial diagnosis of his condition was entirely
wrong, or that his particular case of a given malady was so atypical as tomove it
outside the range of established PSRO norms and standards. In either case, the
protection of the immunity clause would be lost, as it assumes that compliance
with accepted PSRO procedures is in fact justified compliance. This would seem
to be the preferable view, in that it would provide complete immunity within the
narrow sphere of a physician's justifiable choice of and reliance upon appropriate
PSRO norms and standards of diagnosis and treatment, and yet would allow a
plaintiff recourse for actual negligent treatment through a traditional common
law malpractice action.
One commentator has approached the question of properly interpreting
the due care proviso on a procedural basis.'" Like most writers on the subject,
he too favors the intermediate alternative outlined above; since the presumption
of non-negligence (within the well-defined sphere of PSRO compliance) would
operate as a matter of law, he expresses the opinion that it could be brought up
by the defendant via a motion for summary judgment. 16 Such a motion would be
heard by the judge before a trial on the merits, and to overcome the presumption,
the plaintiff would be forced to show either that his particular case was misdiag-
nosed and did not fall at all within the PSRO standards applied by the defendant
or was such an atypical case that it moved outside the ambit of normal treatment
prescribed by the PSRO guidelines.' 7 This of course implies that the physician
would be under an obligation to assess independently the patient's condition
rather than merely adhearing blindly to the PSRO criteria.'
Using this approach, if the only issue before the court were the defen-
dant's diagnosis and subsequent choice of a course of treatment, underiPSRO
norms, and the plaintiff were unable to overcome the presumption of non-negli-
14. E.g., Carter, supra note 13, at 627-38.
15. E.g., Carter, supra note 13, at 627-38.
16. E.g., Carter, supra note 13, at 635-36.
17. E.g., Carter, supra note 13, at 635-36.
18. "The issue in a malpractice action brought against a physician who has acquiesced in the norm
is not the validity of the norm, but whether a substantial minority of the profession would have indepen-
dently determined that care in excess of the PSRO norms was not necessary .... If this cannot be estab-
lished, the physician may not be able to raise successfully the immunity clause defense. On the other hand,
when the physician has utilized all the review procedures and his requested treatment is disapproved in ac-
cordance with the norms, the effect of the immunity clause is to hold him to no higher standard of care than
that established by the norm as applied to the particular case." Note, Professional Standards Review and the
Limitation of Health Services: An Interpretation of the Effect of the Statutory Immunity on-Medical Mal.
practice Liability, 54 B.U.L. Rev. 931, 935-36 (1974).
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gence by either of the two above methods, the defendant should prevail on the
motion for summary judgment. If, on the other hand, the case involved an allega-
tion of lack of due care in performance of the diagnosis or treatment actually
undertaken, lack of due care in applying PSRO norms to the plaintiff's own case, 9
or failure to obtain informed consent," it should be allowed to be heard by the
jury. The commentator who used this procedural analysis believed that it would
be the most feasible means of preserving the primary functions of judge and jury
under state law and yet complying with the statutory intent to provide complete
immunity under certain circumstances. 2 '
A greatly simplified hypothetical example of the above might be seen in
the case of a Medicaid or Medicare beneficiary22 who came to his physician with
an earache. Let us assume that the physician diagnosed the condition as a minor
ear infection and, pursuant to the applicable PSRO norm or standard, prescribed
500 units of penicillin (or another common antibiotic) daily. Further assuming
that the particluar drugs prescribed were not contraindicated by anything in the
patient's medical history, what would happen if the patient's condition were in
fact aggravated by the treatment or grew progressively worse in spite of it?
If the patient chose to sue his physician only on the choice of treatment
selected, the physician would be able to interpose his compliance with accepted
PSRO norms to succeed on a motion for summary judgment. The patient could
possibly avoid such a result if able to show that the physician originally misdiag-
nosed his condition, such that the course of treatment selected was not at all
appropriate, or that his condition was so atypical (e.g., perhaps a very severe,
persistent infection) as to move it outside the particular norms relied upon by
the physician. To accomplish either of these, the plaintiff would be allowed to
introduce expert testimony at the pre-trial summary judgment hearing. If, how-
ever, the plaintiff's suit alleged that the medication in question was prescribed
in the wrong dosage or perhaps negligently administered to him by the physician,
the question of due care would be allowed to go to the jury.
A third potential problem, intimated by the plaintiffs in Weinberger,23 is
the fear by physicians that norms, standards, and criteria promulgated under the
PSRO legislation might be used offensively by malpractice plaintiffs. The ra-
tionale behind this is that the development of specific standards of care will
result in "cookbook medicine," with plaintiffs in malpractice litigation attempting
to introduce the relevant standards into evidence to prove the physician's devia-
tion therefrom. This has been referred to as the "mirror image" problem: 24 the
19. Carter, supra note 13, at 638.
20. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
21. Carter, supra note 13, at 638-39.
22. There is some question as to whether or not the PSRO procedures, including the civil im-
munity clause, would apply to the treatment of a non-recipient of federal aid. At least one author has sug-
gested that they would not apply unless and until the treating physician actually sought PSRO approval of
his course of treatment (thus establishing due care). Heilbrun, The Professional Standards Review Organiza-
tion: Its Impact on Medical Litigation, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 433, 442 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Heilbrun].
Another commentator has countered that this attitude would not be in accord with legislative intent and that
the protections of the civil immunity clause should apply whenever a physician treats a patient in compli-
ance with PSRO norms and standards, whether or not the patient is in fact a recipient of federal aid. Carter,
supra note 13, at 632-33 n.65.
23. 395 F. Supp. at 138-39.
24. Carter, supra note 13, at 624.
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idea that the exact converse of the statute's presumption of non-negligence for
compliance with PSRO standards might be thought to apply.
While different authors have approached this problem in a number of
ways, 2" all agree that the Congressional intent behind the civil immunity pro-
vision, as evidenced by the report of the Senate Finance Committee,26 did not
envision the use of PSRO standards as an offensive legal tactic: "Failure to order
or provide care in accordance with the norms employed by the PSRO is not in-
tended to create a legal presumption of liability." 27
Since this comment is neither clear nor binding, a logical question arises:
If a defendant physician can rely on his compliance with applicable PSRO norms
and standards to receive complete civil immunity within a well-defined sphere of
activity, why cannot these very standards be offered into evidence by a plaintiff
to show his physician's deviation therefrom? Even if this action by the plaintiff
did not raise a presumption of negligence by the defendant, but merely an infer-
ence, should not the plaintiff be allowed to take like advantage of the statute,
notwithstanding Congress' apparent intent to the contrary?
An answer to these questions might be constructed on the basis of mater-
iality. That is, one -could argue that Congress' true intent was to effect physician
compliance with the PSRO program by establishing certain ranges of acceptable
diagnosis and treatment, within which a physician's activity would be immune
from civil liability (noting the limitations on this immunity enumerated above).
However, this argument would continue, where a physician's activites do not
fall within the range of acceptable PSRO standards, the standards are no longer
material to the case. Rather than precluding the plaintiff's recovery, this would
simply compel him to offer his own expert testimony as to the prevailing standard
of care and proof as to the defendant's failure to meet this standard. In essence,
if the defendant were unable to prevail on his motion for summary judgment
alleging compliance with PSRO procedures, the case would revert to a traditional
common law or statutory negligence action. This interpretation would seem to be
in accord with the stated intent of Congress that noncompliance with PSRO
standards not raise a presumption of negligence.
A possible analogy to this seemingly one-sided use of PSRO standards
might be drawn from the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, 28 included as one of
the several bases of liaiblity under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 29 The
Safety Appliance Acts require the use of various safety devices, such as braking
systems30 and automatic couplers,3 1 on all railroad vehicles, and liability for vio-
lation of provisions of the act is absolute. 32 The plaintiff need only establish
a causal relationship between his injury and defective (or missing) safety equip-
ment required by the act;,3 3 this results in an irrebuttable presumption of 1ia-
25. See Simmons and Ball, supra note 13, at 761-62; Carter, supra note 13, at 640-41; Heilbrun,
supra note 22, at 441-42.
26. S. Rep. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 267 (1972).
27. S. Rep.'No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 267 (1972).
28. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq. (1970).
29. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 51 (1970).
30. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 11 (1970).
31. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 2 (1970).
32. Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. R. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 434 (1949).
33. Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. R. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 434-35 (1949).
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bility on the part of the railroad. The defendant railroad cannot interpose its
reasonable care in keeping the required appliances in working order,3 4 nor its
inspection of them, 35 nor the pliantiff's contributory negligence3 6 or assumption
of risk. 3 In short, liability is absolute. This, of course, is the converse of the
PSRO problem, in that the Safety Appliance Acts preclude the defensive use of the
standards set forth in the statute; nevertheless, it indicates the ability of the
government to foreclose the "mirror-image" use of standards set to further a
permissible government objective, especially when Congress has expressed its
intent on the matter.
A closely related question is whether PSRO norms would be admissable
at all - by either side - to establish the physician's standard of care. At least
one jurisdiction has held that such professionally-promulgated guidelines (even if
fairly specific) are not admissible for this purpose.3" Defenders of the civil im-
munity clause might argue, however, that their introduction of the PSRO stand-
ards was not in fact to establish the relevant standard of care, but that this had
already been done by the duly delegated regional PSRO which had promulgated
the. norms. Rather, they might contend that their use of the standards was merely
an attempt to. show physician compliance with them, thus to secure the statutory
grant of immunity. If the particular court refused to recognize this distinction
between the introduction of norms to establish a standard of care and introduc-
tion to demonstrate compliance with an administratively predetermined standard,
an interesting conflict would result. Again, though, based on the various author-
ities cited by the government in the Weinberger case,39 it appears that they would
be able to justify the federal preemption of state substantive and procedural
law on this issue.
It should also be noted that the PSRO legislation contains a fairly strong
confidentiality provision,4" prohibiting disclosure of information acquired by
the PSRO in the performance of its official duties. It thus appears that PSRO
deliberations and determinations of medical necessity and adequacy of care would
not be admissible in a state civil malpractice trial; whether such information
would be subject to judicial subpoena has not been resolved, although it appears
that the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare would strongly oppose
the subpoena power. 41
The legal. efficacy of the PSRO civil immunity clause is purely speculative
at this time, since most PSROs are still in the implementation stage and no court
has. had to. face the question squarely. At the least, the clause ought to afford
immunity within a very narrow, well-defined sphere of professional activity and
subject to the constraints discussed above. Its future effectiveness would perhaps
be enhanced by a statutory amendment clarifying the intent of Congress with
respect to such matters as the due care proviso, the possible offensive use of
PSRO standards, and the admissibility of such standards into evidence, by either
34. Tipton v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Co., 298 U.S. 141, 146 (1936).
35. Apache R. Co. v. Shumway, 62 Ariz. 359, 158 P. 2d 142, 150 (1945).
36. Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1934).
37. 45 U.S.C. See. 7 (1970).
38. Swank v. Halivopoulos, 108 N. J. Super. 120, 127, 260 A. 2d 240, 243 (1969).
39. Supra note 10.
40. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1320c-15 (Supp. IV, 1974).
41. Carter, supra note 13, at 634 n. 74.
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side, in state court proceedings. 42 A number of relevant provisions undoubtedly
will be judicially challenged and interpreted once PSROs are fully implemented
and become a viable force in the health care delivery system.
42. While several provisions of H. R. 3 (95th Cong., 1st Sess.), introduced by Rep. Dan Rosten-
kowski, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee's Health Subcommittee, and by Rep. Paul G. Rogers,
chairman of Interstate and Foreign Commerce's Health Subcommittee, seek to amend the PSRO statue,
none address themselves to the civil immunity issue. Moreover, there is no comparable movement in the U.S.
Senate at this time to amend the PSRO statute at all.
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